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Abstract
Empirical studies provide evidence of positive spillovers from multinational firms to
upstream suppliers coupled with negative spillovers to firms in the same industry. This
paper shows that these empirical regularities can be rationalized in a model with incom-
patibilities between foreign and domestic technologies. When foreign technologies require
specialized inputs, some local suppliers self-select into production for multinational firms.
This ”technological segmentation” in the upstream industry magnifies the productivity
advantage of multinationals by restricting backward and forward linkages to groups of
firms using the same technology. In this setting, we study the role of heterogeneity among
domestic firms. We show that only the best suppliers adopt the foreign technology and
cater to multinationals. In the long run, technology adoption by the most productive
downstream firms creates complementarities with multinationals that can offset the neg-
ative impact of segmentation.
JEL: F23, O14.
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1 Introduction
The host country effects of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) constitute a traditional concern
in international and development economics. One of the consequences of the impressive surge
in FDI flows in recent decades has been to bring this debate back to the fore. The current
view of the impact of multinationals is optimistic, and the general feeling is that, in many
circumstances, their arrival can significantly contribute to the development process in destina-
tion economies. One manifestation of this feeling is the inclusion of FDI attraction policies as
a core element of wider development policy packages by governments all over the developing
world. Moreover, the attraction of foreign investment seems to be high on the policy agendas
of development agencies such as the World Bank, the IMF and the OECD.
Among the potential channels through which FDI is thought to enhance the development
process in host economies, productivity and technological externalities to domestic firms is often
cited as a salient one. Nevertheless, we have a far from full understanding of this issue. Much
of the work done by economists is empirical and concentrates on testing whether spillovers
of this kind actually occur. Typically, studies regress a measure of firm-level productivity
for domestic firms on a measure of foreign presence at sector level. Empirical work of this
type has failed to provide systematic evidence of positive spillovers at horizontal level, that
is, to firms operating in the same sectors as multinational enterprises (MNEs). Furthermore,
many studies have found negative impacts.1 On the other hand, studies testing for vertical
spillovers, i.e. for externalities to upstream suppliers, provide far more optimistic findings.
Multinational presence appears to be correlated with productivity and technological advances
in firms located in supplying industries. Put together, these two empirical regularities are
puzzling. If the arrival of multinational firms causes substantial improvements in the local
supply chain, then we would expect these in turn to spill over, to some extent, to domestic
producers, who consequently have access to a better quality supplier base.
In this paper, we argue that incompatibilities between foreign and local technologies can
affect the nature of linkages between multinational and domestic firms, and explain the above-
mentioned facts. Our model is built around the key assumption that foreign and domestic
technologies are essentially different. A crucial aspect of these differences, other than differ-
1An overview of the empirical literature is provided in Section 2. Nevertheless, the empirical literature on
FDI and spillovers is vast. Readers interested in extensive studies may be referred to Barba and Navaretti
(2004, Ch. 7), Lipsey (2002) and Bolmstrom and Kokko (1997), among others.
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ences in productive efficiency, is that the foreign technology requires specialized inputs. Upon
arrival in a developing economy, foreign firms set up their production plants which operate
with technologies designed in Northern headquarters.2 In so doing, they do not merely expand
the local market for intermediate goods, but rather create a new market for customized inter-
mediates. From the moment there are costs associated with the specialization of inputs, local
entrepreneurs in supplying industries are faced with the decision of whether to upgrade their
products to make them compatible with foreign plants or to stick to domestic methods and
cater to local producers.
One example of such incompatibilities is provided by a recent case study on the Mexican
soaps, detergents and surfactants industry by Javorcik et al. (2006). When Mexico opened its
borders to foreign investors, incoming US multinationals brought with them technologies and
product formats that were previously unavailable locally (e.g. ”compact formulas”). The report
documents how suppliers catering to multinationals (some foreign-owned themselves) had to
reformulate their inputs by substituting foreign standard ingredients with cheaper ingredients
when catering to domestic producers. Moreover, Mexican detergent producers had to incur
substantial costs of reformatting their products in order to introduce the foreign technology.
We ask how multinational entry impacts on the performance of domestic competitors and
consumer welfare. We first consider a short run version of the model where the number of final
goods producers is exogenous. Technological incompatibilities create a segmentation in the
upstream industry that endogenously amplifies the productivity advantage of foreign plants.
The higher the market share of MNEs downstream, the larger the proportion of suppliers
choosing to serve foreign plants. This causes a reduction in the availability of intermediates
compatible with the local technology, raising costs for domestic firms. Thus, negative exter-
nalities arise, that add to conventional business stealing effects that have been the focus of
earlier studies. The negative effect of segmentation in firms’ cost structure might offset po-
tential welfare gains from the introduction of a more productive technology. In this setup, we
introduce heterogeneity among domestic suppliers and show that, consistently with available
evidence, the most productive firms self-select as suppliers for MNEs. Whether firm hetero-
geneity increases multinational profits remains unclear, and dependent on the parameters of
2The decisions of where to source and whether to do it within the boundaries of the firm has been extensively
analyzed elsewhere (see e.g. Antras, 2003 and 2005, Antras and Helpman, 2004, Grossman and Helpman, 2003,
2005). We do not attempt to add anything new to this issue here. It should be stressed, though, that all that
we need is that foreign plants source at least a portion of intermediates from independent local suppliers. The
mechanisms we describe in the text remain if we add in more complex sourcing strategies.
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the productivity distribution. On the other hand, we obtain that, paradoxically, profits of
multinationals decrease with their ability to use domestic inputs. In the light of the model,
we argue that voluntary private standards might constitute a commitment device that would
prevent multinational corporations from using inputs produced with the local technology.
Things can be quite different, though, if domestic firms are allowed to incorporate the foreign
technology.3 We develop a long-run version of the model with free entry, in which heterogeneous
domestic firms can adopt the foreign technology by incurring a fixed cost. Technology adoption
by the most productive firms creates complementarities between these firms and multinationals,
which could trigger further adoption of the foreign technology and lead to a long-run equilibrium
that outweighs autarky in welfare terms. We also show that technological incompatibilities can
endogenously create barriers to entry for both types of firms by raising the costs of inputs.
Our paper contributes to a small, but growing body of formal literature studying backward
linkages between multinational firms and local suppliers. The pioneering study in this area is
by Rodriguez-Clare (1996), who develops a model in which multinationals source intermedi-
ate goods in a low-wage country: if the intensity with which they source local inputs – the
”linkage potential” – is high enough, MNEs create higher net backward linkages that push the
underdeveloped region out of the ”bad” equilibrium. Markusen and Venables (1999) develop a
similar intuition in an industrial organization approach that is closer to ours. As in the work of
Rodriguez-Clare, the demand for inputs (backward linkages) created by foreign plants causes
entry upstream. This exerts downward pressure on the costs of all downstream firms, gener-
ating a forward linkage. Domestic firms, more intensive users of local inputs, gain relatively
more. As a consequence, there exist dynamic paths in which foreign firms are eventually forced
out and only domestic firms prevail. In both papers, however, demand for intermediate goods
from multinational firms is directed to all local upstream firms. This assumption contradicts
evidence suggesting that multinationals tend to source from a small base of local suppliers.
In a recent paper, Lin and Saggi (2007) incorporate exclusivity contracts from a multina-
tional firm to local suppliers in a model of a two-tier Cournot oligopoly, and allow the foreign
firm to transfer technology to upstream firms. Exclusive contracts restrict technology trans-
fers from the multinational firm within the group of exclusive suppliers, thus leaving domestic
3The presence of firms operating a new technology provides opportunities for domestic firms to adopt the
new technology by imitation or reverse engineering. In this regard, there is evidence showing that firms with
high absorptive capacity are those that benefit from positive spillovers from multinational presence (e.g. Girma
and Gorg, 2005). Our model explicitly incorporates this feature and studies its implications.
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producers with suppliers that do not benefit from technology transfers. In our paper, segmen-
tation and spillovers occur instead through structural incompatibilities between modern and
backward technologies. In less developed countries, these incompatibilities may be particularly
important, while it is plausible to argue that exclusive contracts are less likely to be enforceable.
Another difference is that our model highlights externalities between firms. As in the work
of Lin and Saggi (2007), foreign entry increases the cost of inputs for domestic firms. However,
in our model, the scale of multinational entry plays a central role: the higher the level of foreign
entry, the greater the productivity advantage of foreign plants. This suggests the existence of
strategic complementarities among multinationals.4 Our tractable framework also allows for
the analysis of the effects of segmentation at the industry equilibrium.5 Finally, contrary to
existing work, we study the role of productivity heterogeneity among domestic firms. We
show that technological incompatibilities create complementarities between multinationals and
the most productive firms. In line with available evidence, only the best suppliers adopt the
foreign technology and cater to multinational firms. In the long run, we allow for horizontal
technological externalities from multinationals to domestic firms in the downstream sector,
and show that most productive domestic firms adopt the foreign technology and benefit from
the same base of suppliers as multinationals. The increase in the demand for inputs reduces
costs for all of the firms using the foreign technology and encourages entry of both foreign and
domestic firms.
Our work can also be seen as complementary to the literature that highlights the role of
FDI in the international transmission of technology, focusing on human capital, absorptive
capacity and intellectual property rights as key determinants (see Hoeckman and Javorcik,
2006, for a survey). This literature has not yet looked at the technological incompatibilities
that are central to our argument, in spite of the fact that virtually all studies acknowledge
the large differences between multinational and domestic firms. Lastly, a different approach
to technological incompatibilities is central to the debate on appropriate technology (e.g. Ace-
moglu and Zilibotti, 2001, Acemoglu, 2007, and Thoenig and Verdier, 2003), which posits that
technologies developed in Northern countries are incompatible with factor endowments in the
South.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews empirical evidence on
4Lin and Saggi (2007) consider only one multinational firm, and a fixed number of domestic producers.
5Some of our results (e.g. Proposition 3) would not necessarily hold in partial equilibrium.
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multinationals and local firms gathered into a series of stylized facts. Section 3 presents the
model’s set-up and discusses its main assumptions. Section 4 provides a solution of a ”short-
run” version of the model, with an exogenous number of domestic and multinational firms, two
extensions of which are developed in Section 5. Section 6 develops a long-run version of the
model with free entry conditions and the possibility for heterogeneous domestic firms to adopt
the foreign technology. Section 7 concludes.
2 Multinationals and local firms: some stylized facts
In this section, we review the available empirical and anecdotal literature on relationships
between multinational firms and local suppliers in developing countries. We gather together
the different stylized facts that inspired our theoretical analysis.
Fact 1: MNEs are more productive than purely domestic firms and use different
technologies.
Multinational firms have systematically been found to display higher levels of productiv-
ity than domestic firms operating in the same industries, in both developed and developing
economies. These differences persist even after controlling for the fact that FDI tends to be
directed towards skill- and technology-intensive sectors and conducting comparisons of firms in
both host and home economies. Examples of evidence for developed countries include the UK
(Griffith and Simpson, 2001; Criscuolo and Martin, 2001), the US (Doms and Jensen, 1998)
and Italy (Benfratello and Sembrenelli, 2002). Productivity premia seem to be higher in the
case of developing countries. Studies confirming this include Blomstrom and Wolff (1994) on
Mexico, Haddad and Harrison (1994) on Morocco, Aitken and Harrison (1999) on Venezuela,
Sjoholm (1999) on Indonesia and Kokko et al. (1994) on Uruguay. In addition to their higher
productivity, MNEs also tend to be larger than purely domestic firms both in host and home
countries (Barba Navaretti and Venables, 2004, page 13, Ch. 7).
These observed differences in labor and total factor productivity are consistent with the
notion that foreign affiliates have access to more complex and efficient technological and man-
agerial methods than domestic firms in host developing countries. An illustrative example
of how this affects the relationships with suppliers in developing economies is given by the
Mexican industry case study by Javorcik et al. mentioned in the introduction.
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Fact 2: Multinational firms increasingly source inputs in host countries.
Evidence shows that multinationals create linkages with local suppliers in their countries
of operation. Batra et al. (2003) use a manufacturing survey on Malaysia to calculate that
foreign affiliates have a higher probability of establishing vertical linkages with local suppliers
than domestic firms. Similarly, a detailed case study report by Sutton (2001) on the develop-
ment of the automotive industry in India and China in the 1990s concludes that foreign car
manufacturers rely intensively on local suppliers, in keeping with the trend seen in that indus-
try in the world. Alfaro and Rodriguez-Clare (2003) develop a linkage coefficient as the ratio
of the quantity of inputs bought domestically to the number of employees. They empirically
apply this measure to a comparative study of four Latin American economies to find that,
in three cases, the foreign affiliates’ ”backward linkage potential” is statistically significantly
higher than that of the domestic firms. O’Malley (1995) uses the same measure for the Irish
manufacturing industry with similar conclusions. Evidence on Ireland is also found in Forfas
(1999) and Gorg and Ruane (2001), the latter showing that linkages increase over time.
Fact 3: Positive externalities from FDI tend to diffuse vertically along the
supply chain rather than horizontally to firms in the same sector as MNEs.
Studies testing for horizontal externalities turn up mixed results, generally failing to find
positive externalities and often identifying negative effects. A widely cited example is that
of Aitken and Harrison (1999), who study the case of Venezuela and find that while foreign
ownership raises plant productivity, higher MNE presence is associated with a negative effect
on domestic-owned plant productivity. Other examples of failure to find positive horizontal
externalities fromMNEs in developing countries are Djankov and Hoekman (2000) for the Czech
Republic and Konings (2000) for a set of countries. Findings regarding the existence of vertical
spillovers are much more consistent and optimistic. In her study of a panel of Lithuanian
manufacturing firms for the period 1996-2000, Javorcik (2004) finds evidence consistent with
positive externalities on suppliers from increased foreign presence in downstream sectors. This
effect is higher for firms with sales oriented towards the local market. However, her data rejects
the hypothesis of horizontal externalities. Blalock and Gertler (2007) present similar evidence
for Indonesia. Along the same lines, Batra et al. (2003) find that vertical linkages result in
productivity gains for Malaysian suppliers when technology transfers are taken into account.
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Using an alternative method, Kugler (2005) supports the notion of externalities between sectors
by showing that FDI in one sector in Colombian manufacturing can Granger-cause productivity
gains in other sectors, but he does not find evidence of within-sector spillovers. Lastly, in the
abovementioned case study of the Indian and Chinese automotive industries, Sutton reports
that first-tier suppliers of multinational carmakers raised their productivity and quality levels,
attaining European best practices in terms of defect rates. However, these improvements did
not filter down to lower-tier suppliers.
Fact 4: Multinational firms tend to deal with a small, selected base of ”best”
suppliers who comply with international standards.
Case study evidence points to the notion that foreign affiliates tend to develop close relation-
ships with a small base of local suppliers selected by a long, meticulous process. The following
paragraph from the UNCTAD World Investment Report 2001 (page 137) is illustrative of this
point:
”[MNEs] tend to reduce the number of first-tier suppliers and enter into closer
relationships with those that remain. These core suppliers are expected to have
a capability to manufacture and supply – on a global basis – complex systems, to
have independent design capacity and to solve problems jointly with the assembler.
Such requirements make it more difficult for domestic suppliers in host countries to
enter the supply chain (Suzuki’s affiliate in Hungary, for example, only negotiates
with potential suppliers that are already ISO9000 and QS9000 certified)”.
In this regard, one characteristic often highlighted is the role played by local capabilities
in the development of deep backward linkages between local and foreign firms. Multinational
firms single out the failure of local suppliers to comply with their quality, price and delivery
time requirements as major obstacles to the development of backward linkages in the host
economy.6 Foreign affiliates have been described as ”’talent scouts’ in search of local SMEs
capable of becoming global suppliers to the firm” (OECD, 2002).
To the best of our knowledge, there is not as yet any rigorous econometric study available to
test the proposition that only suppliers in the upper tail of the distribution of local capabilities
6FIAS (1997).
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qualify to cater to large foreign-owned corporations.7 However, support for this view can be
found in indirect as well as anecdotal evidence. Javorcik and Spatareanu (2003) look at a
panel of Romanian firms and find a positive effect on supplier productivity only in the case
of partially foreign-owned downstream projects. They attribute their findings to the fact that
firms with some local ownership have better information about the host economy and thus
may have easier access to the best local suppliers. Some studies differentiate suppliers based
on human capital and R&D intensity. They find that only firms with higher capacities reap
positive externalities from inward FDI (Chudnovsky et al. (2004) in the case of Argentina,
Schoors and van der Tol (2001) on Hungary). Selection effects are one plausible explanation
for this result.8 Blalock and Gertler (2007) provide some anecdotal evidence from interviews
with managers of American and Japanese companies operating in Indonesia. Among other
things, these managers stated that: 1) Domestic supplier accreditation is a multistage process
that takes years. In the first stage, foreign firms visit the local factory, analyze a sample
product and send the local supplier to the home market to understand the MNEs’ production
systems. Once the sample is approved, they ask the local firm to produce a small amount and,
if delivery time and quality is up to standard, take it on as a large-scale supplier; 2) ”Suitable”
suppliers are hard to find.
In this regard, multinational firms increasingly impose on prospective suppliers that they
should already have taken on board international standards. While these practices are found
across all industries, they are more frequent in certain sectors. A clear example is given by the
automotive industry. In Slovakia, Volkswagen require that all suppliers first get VDA9 quality
certificates, in keeping with the requirements of the German automotive industry.10 Standards
are an important requisite for entering global supply chains in the food industry as well. For
example, UNCTAD (2007, page 18) reports the case of the European supermarket industry
where supermarkets require that suppliers, irrespective of their country of origin, comply with
private protocols of food safety standards, logistical requirements and process documentation.
Generally, ISO norms are by far the most prominent type of standards, regardless of the indus-
7Such a study might prove quite demanding in terms of the data required. One would have to know the
ex-ante (i.e. before FDI) distribution of local capabilities and match the most capable suppliers with the ex-post
distribution of contracts with multinationals. Note that any finding that MNEs’ suppliers are on average more
capable than firms supplying only domestic firms would not be that illuminating, since there is evidence that
working for MNEs increases supplier capabilities (e.g. Sutton, 2001).
8A complementary, and more frequently advanced, explanation is the fact that firms with higher levels of
human capital or R&D are those able to reap potential knowledge spillovers associated with foreign presence.
9Verband der Automobilindustrie.
10UNCTAD (2001), page 157.
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try in question: a survey conducted by Mobil Corporation found that ISO 9000 registration is
now recognized as the basis for quality process definition in 68 countries.11
3 Setup of the model
We now develop a partial equilibrium model of an economy composed of two vertically related
industries. Multinational firms are assumed to enter the local downstream industry to serve
local consumers.
Preferences
Consumer preferences are assumed to be represented by a utility function of the form:
Y =
(∫ N
0
Y
η−1
η
j
) η
η−1
where η > 1 is the elasticity of substitution of any two varieties of the generic consumer good
Y . N represents the total number of downstream varieties.12 If E denotes the exogenous
income spent in Y industry in terms of numeraire good13, the producer of a given variety j
will have a demand curve of the form:
Yj =
(
Pj
P
)−η
E
P
.
where Pj is the price of variety j and P =
(∫ N
0
P 1−ηj
) 1
1−η
the price index of the final goods.
Production
The final goods industry is populated by ND domestic and NM multinational firms.
Two technologies for final goods production co-exist: a domestic ”D-technology” and a
foreign ”M-technology”. The efficiency of each is given by a technological parameter λ indexing
the quantity of intermediate inputs required to produce one unit of final good. The assumption
λM < λD reflects the relative technological backwardness of the domestic technology.
11Cited by Shoemaker et al. (1995).
12For ease of reading, we shall henceforth denote all variables pertaining to the downstream industry in
uppercase, as opposed to lowercase for upstream industry variables.
13Our results hold if, for example, the size of the industry decreases with price index P .
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A central assumption is the requirement of technology-specific intermediate goods. We call
D-type inputs those compatible with the D-technology, and M-type inputs those produced for
use with the M-technology. Following Ethier (1982), horizontally differentiated intermediate
goods are assumed to enter final production as a CES composite, with the elasticity of substi-
tution between any two varieties denoted by σ, and assumed to be equal for both technologies.
Throughout, we assume for stability that σ > η. Formally, if T ∈ {D,M}, the corresponding
production function is
XT =
(∫ nT
0
x
σ−1
σ
i
) σ
σ−1
and the variable cost of producing using technology T is equal to λT pT , where the price index
of T-type inputs (obtained by duality on XT ) is:
pT =
(∫ nT
0
p1−σiT di
)1/(1−σ)
Thus, for a sufficiently large number of downstream firms ND+NM , the price of a single variety
j produced under technology T is Pj = ηη−1λT pT .
In the baseline specification, we study the extreme case in which inputs designed for one
type of technology are completely useless to producers operating under the alternative one.
Later on, we show that our results hold as long as inputs are not completely compatible.
We now turn to upstream producers. Applying Sheppard’s lemma to the price index, we
obtain the demand for each variety of a given type
xiT =
(
piT
pT
)−σ
IT
where IT is total (endogenous) demand for inputs of type T. With a continuum of local en-
trepreneurs, individual decisions are made taking the environment as given, and this results in
the usual mark-up pricing formula pi = σσ−1ci, where c are unit costs in terms of the numeraire
good.
Entry into the upstream industry requires a fixed cost fe measured in terms of the nu-
meraire. Local entrepreneurs are assumed to be ”born” with the knowledge to produce inputs
for the domestic backward D-technology. Conversely, the production of M-type inputs requires
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extra overhead costs of magnitude fq.14
4 Solution of the model: short run
We now proceed to the solution of the model in the short run, where the number of downstream
firms ND and NM is taken as exogenous, and only multinationals have access to the foreign
technology.
Equilibrium under technological segmentation
A ”technological segmentation” regime refers to a situation in which foreign affiliates import
the foreign technology and (some) local suppliers adapt their intermediates.
Suppliers make technology decisions by weighing the gains from specializing in the M-
technology against their costs in terms of fixed costs and lost demand from domestic firms. An
equilibrium is defined by a situation in which the net profits of specializing in either technology
are equal. Moreover, the free entry condition imposes zero net profits at equilibrium. If we
denote by q ∈ [0, 1] the proportion of suppliers choosing to produce for multinationals and n
the equilibrium number of suppliers, equilibrium in the upstream industry is defined by the
following system of equations:  piM (q, n) = fe + fqpiD(q, n) = fe
where piT represents ex post profits accruing from specializing in T -type inputs. Note that
profits for a supplier choosing T depend negatively on the number of suppliers choosing T as well
(affecting the slope of the perceived demand curve via business stealing effects) and positively
on total demand for T-type inputs (affecting the position of the perceived demand schedule).
However, total demand for T-type inputs depends on the market share of downstream firms
using technology T, which is itself a function of the number of suppliers choosing to produce
for the T-technology. Relative market shares and profits of downstream firms are a function of
relative costs, which depend on q as follows:
ΠM
ΠD
=
C1−ηM
C1−ηD
=
λ1−ηM q
1−η
1−σ
λ1−ηD (1− q)
1−η
1−σ
(1)
14Alternatively, one could assume that the fixed entry cost for producing M-type inputs is higher than the
fixed entry cost for producing D-type inputs by an amount fq .
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Incorporating these expressions, we get the unique pair (n, q) satisfying the system of equations
(see Appendix C). It is characterized by:
n =
αE
fe + qfq
(2)
q
1− q =
(
NM
ND
λ1−ηM
λ1−ηD
fe
fe + fq
)θ
(3)
where θ is defined by θ ≡ σ−1σ−η > 1.
The proportion of suppliers switching to the M-technology in equilibrium increases with
the relative efficiency of the foreign technology and the scale of foreign entry. This last effect
points to a positive externality among multinationals and highlights a major idea of this paper,
which is that technological similarities among foreign plants are a source of strategic comple-
mentarities. Massive multinational entry puts pressure on to develop a more complete supply
chain attached to the modern technology. Inversely, it has a negative effect on domestic firms
relying on a smaller number of suppliers.
It impacts directly on equilibrium profits. Plugging (3) into (1), we obtain:
ΠM
ΠD
=
C1−ηM
C1−ηD
=
(
Λ1−ηM
Λ1−ηD
)θ (
NM
ND
)θ−1
(4)
where ΛM = λM (fe+fq)
1
σ−1 and ΛD = λDf
1
σ−1
e are indices for the social cost of each technology
(i.e. taking into account the cost of creating new input varieties).
Interestingly, θ measures the elasticity of relative efficiency to relative profits, which is
higher than one: differences in technological efficiency amplify differences in terms of ”real”
efficiency (i.e. taking into account the costs of intermediates), because the more productive
technology attracts more suppliers, resulting in a wider range of intermediate varieties.
Thus, the model gives rise to a mechanism by which the suppliers’ technological special-
ization creates a causal link from technological to ”real” advantages for foreign plants. Note
that industry-wide equilibrium effects add to the more conventional business stealing effects,
prompting an intuition that is consistent with empirical evidence showing positive externali-
ties for firms upstream and negative horizontal effects.15 Backward and forward linkages are
15Variable costs λM and λD may also be interpreted as the product of variable costs downstream and
variable costs upstream. Assuming λM < λD is thus consistent with the fact that the introduction of the
foreign technology improves supplier performance.
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limited to the scope of firms using the same technology and do not spread to all firms in the
industry. We summarize these findings in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 In a segmented equilibrium, the technological advantage of multinational firms
is amplified by the endogenous specialization of suppliers toward the foreign technology and it
increases with the relative proportion of multinational firms in the downstream sector.
Proposition 1 is a testable prediction. While we are not aware of any studies positing
supplier selection as a determinant of the ”multinational” productivity premium, a recent
study on the Czech Republic and Russia by Sabirianova et al. (2005) found that a greater
presence of foreign firms in a sector negatively affected the average productivity of domestic
firms while it impacted positively on the productivity of other foreign firms. Note also that, in
cases where proximity to suppliers is economically relevant, the above provides an intuition as
to the mutual advantages for foreign plants to locate close to each other in clusters. Evidence
of foreign-specific agglomeration forces has been found by Barrios et al. (2002) in Ireland.
Technological segmentation and consumer welfare
In the short run, the overall effect of multinational entry on consumer welfare will depend
upon the relative strength of two forces. Firstly, the arrival of multinationals improves welfare
through the introduction of a more efficient technology. Secondly, this comes at a cost of
segmentation in the upstream industry, by which each type of downstream firm sources from
a smaller range of varieties compared with an equilibrium where all suppliers produce for the
same technology. Formally, we can state the following condition, determining whether the
equilibrium under technological segmentation is preferable to autarky.
Proposition 2 The introduction of the foreign technology improves consumer welfare when
the following condition (W) holds:
Λ1−ηM
Λ1−ηD
>
[(
1 +
ND
NM
)θ
−
(
ND
NM
)θ] 1θ
.
(W) implies that the foreign technology is more efficient (Λ1−ηM /Λ
1−η
D > 1) but the opposite
does not hold: the introduction of a more efficient technology may be welfare-reducing under
technological segmentation.
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Proof. See Appendix C.
When θ = σ−1σ−η is close to one, welfare effects are positive where the foreign technology is
more efficient. Distortions appear as θ grows (according to expressions (3) and (4), a higher
θ yields stronger backward and forward linkages), in which case the introduction of a more
advanced technology may be welfare-reducing.
The above proposition compares the impact of the introduction of the foreign technology
with a case where multinationals enter and adopt the domestic technology. If we make the
alternative hypothesis that multinational firms can choose between the two technologies16, it is
possible to show that a segmented equilibrium can be feasible and welfare-reducing in a range
of parameters (see Appendix A).
Finally, note that a strict comparison with autarky would depend on the mode of entry
chosen by multinationals. If FDI occurs exclusively through acquisitions of domestic firms,
the total number of downstream varieties remains constant. Therefore, the counterfactual
comparison with autarky is equivalent to the comparison with the case where multinational
firms produce using the local technology. If, on the other hand, FDI takes the form of greenfield
investment, consumers also benefit from an increase in the number of available varieties.17
5 Two extensions to the baseline model
5.1 Partial compatibility of inputs
We now relax our assumption to allow for the more realistic situation in which there is some de-
gree of compatibility among technologies, and show that our mechanisms are robust to allowing
for a more flexible view of technology. Specifically, suppose that in foreign plants, m > 1 units
of D-type inputs are equivalent to one unit of the M-type, with the symmetric parameter for
domestic plants being d > 1. Hence, these parameters measure the degree of incompatibility
across technologies; the higher their value, the less compatible the technologies are. Analyti-
cally, the characterization of the equilibrium is as before. Solving for the equilibrium ratio of
16There are a number of instances of multinational firms in developing countries producing low-quality goods
that would not match international standards. For example, Renault’s production of the ”Logan” in India and
Volkswagen’s production of the original Beetle in Mexico using technologies dating from the 1950s (Verhoogen,
2008).
17The drop in price index from autarky to a non-segmented equilibrium would be equal to
(
ND
ND+NM
) 1
η−1 .
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profits (see Appendix C) gives the equivalent of expression ?? in this new setting:
ΠM
ΠD
=
C1−ηM
C1−ηD
=
(
λ1−ηM
λ1−ηD
)θ (
NM
ND
[
fe −m1−σ(fe + fq)
(fe + fq)− d1−σfe
])θ−1
(5)
As in the baseline case, equilibrium profits for the multinationals increase with NM/ND
and decrease with λM/λD. However, note the role of the new parameters, m and d. As can be
seen, and somewhat paradoxically, the relative cost for the multinational firms decreases with
the cost of adopting D-type inputs. This is due to the fact that higher compatibility of the
M-technology with D-type inputs (lower m) reduces the incentive for suppliers to specialize in
the foreign technology, which in turn reduces the multinational firms’ competitive advantage.
If the degree of technological compatibility is symmetric, that is m = d = τ , this finding
holds for multinational firms: multinational firms’ profits increase with τ whereas domestic
firms’ profits decrease with τ . Thus, generally, we can put forward the following proposition:
Proposition 3 In an equilibrium with technological segmentation, the competitive advantage of
multinational firms decreases with their ability to use inputs produced using the local technology.
Interestingly, individual incentives regarding m are the opposite: a single multinational’s
profits increase with the possibility of incorporating more inputs. Imagine that several technolo-
gies are available and that they differ only in the value of parameter m as defined above. Taken
individually, the multinational prefers the technology with high compatibility with the local
technologies. Thus, in the absence of a commitment device, a situation where multinational
firms choose the technologies with the highest incompatibilities (a strategy that maximizes
their profits collectively) would not be a Nash equilibrium.
There would hence be collective incentives for the design of a commitment device to prevent
firms from individually deviating from common technological standards. We argue that this
mechanism could offer a new insight into collective ”voluntary private standards”. Imagine
if we were to re-interpret our M-technology as corresponding to a commitment to use only
inputs certified as being produced under some safety, quality or environmental standards. As
stated by Fact 4, the most prominent example of these are clearly the ISO standards, but an
array of similar certifications has sprung up in recent decades.18 Typically, these standards are
developed by private or quasi-private organizations in which multinational corporations play a
18Examples of business associations developing private standards in the food industry are EurepGAP, Inter-
national Food Standards and the BRC Global Standard.
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significant role.19 The intuitions developed here might help explain why even when these prac-
tices risk impacting negatively on the cost structure (by preventing firms from buying inputs
produced by non-compliant suppliers), they can still be a profitable strategy, as expression (??)
suggests.
An alternative interpretation is that parameters m and d measuring the costs of adopting
alternative inputs are generated by trade costs if groups of firms are physically distant from
each other – for example if τ = m = d represents symmetric trade costs in intermediate
inputs. In this scenario, domestic firms prefer to locate closer to multinational firms whereas
multinational firms may collectively prefer to locate further away.
5.2 Heterogeneous suppliers
As documented by Fact 4, multinational firms tend to source only from a selected base of the
best suppliers. In the baseline model, suppliers are differentiated by technological specializa-
tion. In this section, we introduce differences in the suppliers’ capabilities. A selection process
occurs whereby only the best suppliers specialize in the M-technology. Hence, multinational
firms source at equilibrium only from suppliers with the more efficient technology and the
highest productivity, in keeping with Fact 4.
To account for supplier heterogeneity in our framework, we modify the baseline model as
follows. We assume that, upon entry, and once final firms have entered and multinationals
have made decisions about technology, upstream entrepreneurs draw their variable cost ci from
a cumulative generic distribution H(c). Then, with full knowledge of their cost parameter,
suppliers choose whether to produce using the D-technology or to pay the upgrading cost to
produce M-type inputs and serve multinationals. We use this set-up to study how decisions
about technology upgrading are determined by heterogeneous individual capabilities.
A supplier will choose the foreign technology if, and only if, the profits associated with the
production of the M-type inputs exceed the profits associated with the production of D-type
inputs plus the fixed cost of technology upgrading, given that suppliers only serve downstream
firms using the same technology. If we denote AD and AM as the demand for each input type
(endogenous in the system, but taken as given by individual suppliers), then post-entry profits
19Morrison (2006).
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associated with each technology for a firm receiving a draw ci are piD(ci) = ADc
1−σ
i
piM (ci)− fq = AMc1−σi − fq
Note that, at equilibrium, necessarily AM > AD. If this were not the case, then obviously
no supplier would choose the M-technology. Yet if multinational firms were to need M-type
inputs, the profits of the marginal supplier choosing the M-technology would be infinite since
it would face no competition: such a case is therefore impossible (AM < AD implies AM =∞).
Thus we can safely state that AM > AD, that is, once fixed upgrading costs are paid, it is
more profitable to produce inputs compatible with the new technology. Moreover, the higher
the supplier’s productivity, the greater the gains from producing M-type inputs. It follows that
best suppliers specialize in the foreign technology and other suppliers produce inputs suited
for the local technology.
Proposition 4 In an equilibrium with technological segmentation, the best suppliers produce
inputs designed for the foreign technology.
Formally, the cutoff cost c∗ that equates profits from both technologies, is defined by the
condition:
piM (c∗)− fq = piD(c∗)
Firms with costs below c∗ switch to the M-technology and firms with costs above c∗ remain with
the D-technology. Note that the stability assumption (i.e. σ > η) ensures that, at equilibrium,
there is always a positive number of suppliers for each technology (that is, 0 < c∗ < ∞ and
0 < q < 1).
In order to fully characterize the industry equilibrium, we need to consider the free entry
condition. Free entry implies that net expected profits (before capabilities are revealed) are
equal to zero after subtracting the fixed entry cost fe. This condition gives us a second equation
that can be used to solve the total number of upstream firms n. Under the assumption that
σ > η and that the distribution of capabilities is not too distorted20, both conditions uniquely
determine n and c∗.
Finally, a natural question arises: does heterogeneity benefit multinational firms? In other
20When the distribution is similar or less skewed than Pareto distributions at both ends, we can show that a
single solution exists. The solution, however, is generally not analytically tractable.
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words, would they prefer to locate in sectors supplied by upstream industries with higher dis-
persion in productivity, ceteris paribus? Although best suppliers choose to serve multinational
firms, productivity dispersion among suppliers does not always raise multinational firms’ prof-
its. It all depends on the shape of the distribution of capabilities, as well as the fixed costs of
technology adoption and the proportion of M-type suppliers. Appendix B analyzes the condi-
tions under which productivity dispersion positively impacts on multinational firms’ profits.
6 Long-run industry equilibrium
In this section we solve a long-run version of the model in which entry and exit of downstream
domestic firms and multinational firms is endogenized. Further, we allow for domestic firms to
have the opportunity of incorporating the foreign technology brought in by foreign plants; the
idea being that FDI acts as an international conductor of technology, by bringing in methods
otherwise unavailable in autarky. Technological adoption can occur by means of imitation,
reverse engineering or licensing. We make the assumption that it requires extra fixed costs.
Nevertheless, some domestic firms might find it optimal to upgrade since what they stand to
gain can offset the extra costs. Gains from switching to the foreign technology come from two
sides. On the one hand, the foreign technology is assumed to be more efficient than the domestic
one, as indexed by the ratio λM/λD. On the other hand, and contrary to our static version
of the model, by incorporating the foreign technology, domestic producers can benefit from
complementarities with multinationals in the upstream market. Depending on the equilibrium,
this might act as a reinforcing mechanism favoring technological adoption among indigenous
firms and reducing the negative impact of the technological incompatibilities described in the
previous sections.
Domestic firms are assumed to be heterogeneous in productivity, in the spirit of Melitz
(2003). Upon entry, domestic producers draw a (positive) productivity level ϕi from a con-
tinuous cumulative distribution G(ϕ), assumed to be common knowledge. This firm-specific
productivity parameter is independent of the unit costs associated with the choice of technol-
ogy. A firm receiving a draw ϕi and choosing technology T has a unit cost equal to CTϕi . Right
after receiving their draw, domestic firms decide whether to adopt the foreign technology, which
implies paying extra fixed costs Fq, or alternatively to produce with the D-technology at no
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extra cost. Profits associated with each of these decisions are:
ΠDi =
ϕη−1
i
C1−η
D
E
P 1−η
ΠqDi =
ϕη−1
i
C1−η
M
E
P 1−η − Fq
where P is the industry price index and the superscript q indicates profits for a domestic firm
that has incorporated the M-technology.
Technological adoption in the downstream sector is thus driven by a self-selection mech-
anism. Clearly, when C1−ηM < C
1−η
D then no domestic firm chooses the foreign technology.
On the contrary, in the case where C1−ηM > C
1−η
D , profits from producing final goods with
the M-technology are greater than with the D-technology and the difference may exceed the
technology upgrading costs Fq. Moreover, the higher the productivity draw, the larger the
profit differential and thus the more profitable it is to pay the fixed costs of adoption. Hence,
there exists a cutoff level for ϕi making a firm indifferent to whether it adopts or not. This is
implicitly given by:
ΠqD(ϕ
∗)−ΠD(ϕ∗) = Fq (FTD)
which we call the ”free technological adoption” condition for domestic firms (FTD). Given that
firms have knowledge of the underlying cumulative distribution G(ϕ), they anticipate ex-post
profits and thereby make entry decisions calculating the ex-ante expected gains from entry.
Expected profits are
E[ΠD] =
∫ ϕ∗
0
ΠD(ϕ)dG(ϕ) +
∫ ∞
ϕ∗
[ΠqD(ϕ)− Fq] dG(ϕ)
With an unbounded pool of potential entrants, expected profits will adjust until their value net
of fixed entry costs FD is driven to zero. The free entry condition for domestic firms (FED) is
then written E[ΠD] = FD.
Multinationals are assumed to enter the host country as long as expected profits are positive.
This induces a free entry condition equating profits to fixed costs of entry, ΠM = FM , labeled
(FTM). Note that this implies that multinationals make their entry decisions by anticipating
that some local firms will imitate their technology. For the sake of simplicity, foreign firms
are assumed to be homogeneous in productivity. Hence the individual productivity parameter
ϕMj equals average productivity ϕ˜M .21 We assume that fixed costs for foreign plants are high
21Since no firm exits after entry, heterogeneity among multinationals has no effect.
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enough for multinationals to only be able to survive in equilibrium by importing their more
efficient technologies.22
Lastly, interactions in the upstream industry remain the same as in the basic model.
Under these specifications, the long-run equilibrium is formally defined by the following
system of equations, 
piM (q, n) = fe + fq (5.1)
piD(q, n) = fe (5.2)
E[ΠD] = FD (5.3)
ΠqD(ϕ
∗)−ΠD(ϕ∗) = Fq (5.4)
ΠM = FM (5.5)
The set of unknowns is composed of the following 5-tuple: (n, q,ND, NM , ϕ∗). These are,
respectively: the number of upstream varieties, the proportion of suppliers specializing in the
M-technology, the number of domestic final producers, the number of multinationals, and the
cutoff productivity that defines the adoption of the M-technology by domestic producers.
We would like to provide an analysis of the welfare economics of foreign entry. The right
counterfactual here is the level of welfare attained in the equilibrium without multinationals
(and thus without the introduction of the foreign technology). Given that profits are driven to
zero in the long run, the only source of welfare is consumer surplus. We thus need to look at
changes in the price index for consumer goods under the two regimes.
We can reformulate the initial system of five equations on five unknowns as a system of two
equations on two unknowns to study the different equilibria in terms of welfare. The two vari-
ables that we will focus on are the proportion of suppliers adopting the foreign technology and
the downstream industry price index (inversely related to competitive pressure and consumer
welfare).
The rationale for this choice of variables is based on the fact that both free entry conditions
for downstream firms (equations 5.3 and 5.5) represent combinations of the fixed entry costs,
variable costs (determined by the number of suppliers for each technology) and competitive
pressure (derived from the inverse of the price index in the downstream industry) that leave
individual firms with no profits. Therefore, they can be rewritten23 as an equality between the
22Formally, this implies FM
FD
>
ϕ˜
η−1
M
ϕ˜
η−1
D
. The fact that foreign firms can be forced out in the non-segmented
equilibrium is equivalent to the case of Markusen and Venables (1999) and will not be developed here.
23See Appendix C.
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price index and a function of fixed and (expected) variable costs which, as shown in Section 4,
depend on q. We denote fM (q) as the resulting function for multinationals, and fD(q) as the
resulting function for domestic producers.
 P
1−η = fM (q)
P 1−η = fD(q)
Note that fM (q) must be an increasing function. Intuitively, the higher q, the greater
the competitive advantage of firms using the M-technology and the greater the incentives for
multinationals to enter the host industry. The case of domestic firms is slightly more complex,
as the relationship is non monotonic. When q is low, no domestic firm finds it optimal to pay
the fixed costs and adopt the M-technology. In this case, expected profits decrease with the
proportion of upgrading suppliers, as this implies higher costs for firms using the D-technology.
It follows that the competitive pressure from domestic firms decreases with q when q is low.
However, when q reaches a threshold such that a sufficient proportion of domestic firms adopts
the M-technology after entry, increases in the proportion of upgrading suppliers may have
positive effects on the domestic firms’ expected profits. In other words, the higher q, the greater
the competitive advantage of using the M-technology, the larger the proportion of upgrading
domestic firms and the more beneficial the decrease in the cost of M-type inputs. This makes
the derivative of fD with respect to q increase faster than that of fM . This property ensures
that the system has at most two interior solutions.
Figure 1 plots these two functions when the distribution of domestic firms’ capabilities is
parameterized with a Pareto distribution.24 The price index P 1−η is expressed as a ratio to the
autarky price index (values higher than one correspond to welfare gains). The curves fM (q)
and fD(q) are zero-profit contours for foreign and domestic plants and are represented in red
and black respectively. In each case, points below the curves are combinations of P 1−η and q
generating positive profits, whereas points above the curves represent situations where profits
are negative.
The vertical line in the graph is defined by the equality between CM and CD and gives the
minimum value of q whereby the most productive domestic firm finds it optimal to upgrade to
the foreign technology. Below this value, there is no adoption by local firms.
24Details as well as values used in the simulations are provided in Appendix C.
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[Figure 1 about here]
There are two stable equilibria. A first equilibrium is similar to autarky, with no welfare
gain. When q = 0, only domestic firms can survive (as the fD curve is above the fM curve)
and no firm adopts the foreign technology. The second stable equilibrium corresponds to the
interior solution for the highest value of q. This equilibrium is mixed as both multinational
and domestic firms co-exist, with the most productive domestic firms adopting the foreign
technology. This equilibrium is stable because, for example, when q decreases, entry is more
profitable for the multinational firms than for the domestic firms, which in turn positively
affects q.
In the latter equilibrium, welfare is higher than in autarky.25 The negative effect of segmen-
tation that prevails in the short run may be offset by the adoption of the foreign technology by
domestic firms, which also leads to wider adoption of the foreign technology by upstream firms.
Firm heterogeneity plays an important role, given that the most productive firms upgrade their
technology and increase their profits. Hence we obtain a stable and mixed equilibrium where
positive welfare gains are derived from the complementarities between multinational firms and
the most productive domestic firms, both of which benefit from a more advanced technology
and a larger base of local suppliers.
Note, however, that the interior solution for the lowest value of q is not stable: if q increases
slightly, entry by multinationals is more likely than entry by domestic firms, which tends to
increase q.
Also note that, if we start with a situation where the downstream industry is populated
solely by multinational firms and q = 1, domestic firms will enter (as the fD curve is above
the fM curve in Figure 1) until the economy reaches the stable interior equilibrium. Yet this
mechanism is restricted to the case where the cost of adopting the foreign technology is not
too high.26
Figure 2 shows how the equilibria are distorted when we increase the costs of technology
adoption.
[Figure 2 about here]
This is reflected by a downward shift in the FED curve. In this case, there is no interior
25As there is no analytical solution, it is unfortunately not possible to derive a necessary and sufficient
condition for welfare improvements in the general case.
26In Appendix C, we provide a sufficient and necessary condition on the cost of technology adoption.
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(stable) equilibrium. In the long run, the economy is either populated by domestic firms (as
in autarky where q = 0) or by multinational firms only (where q = 1). Thus, when technology
adoption costs are high, a policy favoring large entry of multinational firms can result in
an endogenous barrier to entry for domestic firms. In a situation where the downstream
industry is populated mostly by multinational firms, the cost of technology adoption prevents
domestic firms from benefiting from the large base of local suppliers producing using the foreign
technology. This creates a barrier to entry in stark contrast to the conclusions drawn by
Markusen and Venables (1999).
Similarly, technological incompatibilities also create a barrier to entry by multinational
firms when the proportion of suppliers using the foreign technology is small. In Figures 1
and 2, the multinational firms’ profits are smaller than the domestic firms’ profits when the
proportion of suppliers using the foreign technology remains small. Therefore, only massive
entry by multinational firms would trigger a switch from an equilibrium with domestic firms
only to an equilibrium with a positive number of firms using the foreign technology.
7 Concluding remarks
The effects of FDI on the host country are a matter of ongoing debate. Economists have em-
phasized the role of backward and forward linkages with local firms, as well as the introduction
of more advanced technologies. In this paper, we develop a tractable model to show how tech-
nological incompatibilities may affect the nature of the linkages with local suppliers and the
nature of competition between foreign affiliates and domestic firms. FDI effects on the host-
country industry depend on its technological backwardness interacting with local capabilities
and initial competition, as well as the scale of entry by foreign affiliates.
To be more precise, we argue that local downstream firms may not benefit from technological
improvements in the upstream industry as these can reduce the base of suppliers producing
inputs that are compatible with the local technology. Furthermore, technological segmentation
in the upstream industry amplifies the productivity advantage of multinational firms. This
mechanism can explain the puzzling evidence of positive vertical externalities at the same
time as negative horizontal externalities. As suggested by the model, this also implies some
potentially perverse effects of voluntary private norms, which have played an increasing role in
the recent years. When firms are heterogeneous in terms of productivity, we show that only
24
the most productive suppliers adopt the foreign technology and cater to multinational firms.
We then develop a long-run version of the model in which the entry and exit decisions
of all types of firms are made endogenous. Further, we allow domestic firms to benefit from
contacts with multinationals by assuming that they themselves are able to adopt the modern
foreign technology. With the combined assumptions of productivity heterogeneity and fixed
cost of technology adoption, we find that the most productive firms self-select into the foreign
technology. We then study the long-run welfare effects of multinational entry and its impact on
local industrial development. We find that technological incompatibilities interact with the cost
of adoption of the foreign technology in non-monotonic ways, and that given the multiplicity
of equilibria, initial conditions matter.
Finally, the spillover effects of FDI on the host economy with technological incompatibilities
could be tested. We hope that our paper will inspire future empirical research on the basis of
the model’s results. For instance, according to expression (1) and Proposition 1, one possibility
would be to regress the productivity difference between domestic and multinational firms on
the proportion of upstream suppliers with ISO certification or another technological index.
Another possibility would be to test whether the positive externalities between multinational
firms and qualified suppliers that we formalize affect the location of foreign affiliates.
25
References
[1] Acemoglu, D. (2007) ”Equilibrium Bias of Technology”, Econometrica, Vol. 75, pp. 1371-
1410.
[2] Acemoglu, D. and Zilibotti, F. (2001) ”Productivity Differences”, Quaterly Journal of
Economics, Vol. 116, pp. 563-606.
[3] Alfaro, L. and Rodriguez-Clare, (2004) ”Multinationals and Linkages: An Empirical In-
vestigation”, Economia, Vol. 4, Nr 2.
[4] Aitken, B. and Harrison, A. (1999), ”Do Domestic Firms Benefit from Direct Foreign
Investment? Evidence from Venezuela”, American Economic Review, Vol. 89.
[5] Antras, P. and Helpman, E. (2004), ”Global Sourcing”, Journal of Political Economy, Vol.
112, No. 3.
[6] Antras, P. (2003), ”Firms, contracts, and trade”, Quaterly Journal of Economics, Vol.
118, No. 4.
[7] Antras, P. (2005), ”Incomplete Contracts and the Product Cycle”, American Economic
Review, Vol. 95, No. 4.
[8] Barba-Navaretti, G. and Venables, A. (2004),Multinational Firms in the World Economy,
Princeton University Press, Princeton.
[9] Batra, Morisset and Saggi (2002), ”Vertical Linkages Between Multinationals And Do-
mestic Suppliers: Whom Do They Benefit And Why?”, manuscript, IFC.
[10] Bolmstrom, and Kokko, (1997) The Impact of Foreign Investment on Host Countries: A
Review of the Empirical Evidence World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 1745
[11] Blalock, G. and Gertler, P. (2007), ”Welfare gains from Foreign Direct Investment through
Technology Transfers to Local Supplier”, Journal of International Economics.
[12] Benfratello, L. and Sembrenelli, A. (2002) ”Foreign Ownership and Productivity: is the
direction of causality so obvious?”, Centro Studi d’Agliano, Working Paper 166.
[13] Caves, R. (1974) ”Multinational Firms, Competition, and Productivity in Host-Country
Markets”, Economica, Vol. 38.
[14] Chudnovsky, D., A. Lopez & Gaston Rossi (2004) ”Foreign direct investment spillovers,
public policies and the absorption capabilities of domestic firms in the Argentine manu-
facturing sector (1992-2001)” , CENIT, Buenos Aires, mimeo.
[15] Ciccone, A. and Matsuyama, K. (1996) ”Start-up Costs and Pecuniary Externalities as
Barriers to Economic Development”, Vol. 49 Issue 1.
[16] Criscuolo, C. and Martin, R. (2003) ”Multinationals, Foreign Ownership and Productivity
in UK Businesses”, Royal Economic Society Conference, Vol. 50.
[17] Djankov, S. and Hoekman, B. (2000) ”Foreing Investment and Productivity Growth in
Czech Entreprises”, World Bank Economic REview, Vol. 14, Issue 1.
[18] Doms, M. and Jensen, J. (1998) ”Comparing Wages, Skills and Productivity between
Domestically and Foreing-Owned Manufacturing Establishments in the United States”,
in Geography and Ownership as bases for Economic Accounting, Studies in Income and
Wealth, R. Baldwin, et. al Vol. 59 pp 235-258, University of Chicago Press.
26
[19] Dunning, J. (1977). “The determinants of international production.Oxford Economic Pa-
pers, Vol. 25, No. 3, pp. 289-336.
[20] Ethier, W. (1982), ”National and international returns to scale in the modern theory of
international trade”, American Economic Review Vol. 72, Issue 3, 389-405.
[21] Forfas (1999) ”Annual Survey of Irish Economy Expenditures: Results for 1997”, Dublin.
[22] Girma, S. and Gorg, H. (2005) ”Foreign Direct Investments, Spillovers and Absorptive
Capacity: evidence from Quantile Regressions”, Discussion Papers Series 1: Economic
Studies, N. 12/2005.
[23] Globerman, S. (1979), ”Foreign Direct Investment and ”Spillover” Efficiency Benefits in
Canadian Manufacturing Industries”, Canadian Journal of Economics, Vol. 12.
[24] Gorg, H. and Ruane, F. (2001) ”Multinational Companies and Linkages: Panel-Data
Evidence for the Irish Electronics Sector”, International Journal of the Economics of
Business, Vol. 8, Issue 1.
[25] Griffith, R. and Simpson, H. (2001), ”Characteristics of Foreing-owned firms in British
Manufacturing”, The Institute for Fiscal Studies Working Paper 01/10.
[26] Grossman, G. and Helpman, E. (2003), ”Outsourcing versus FDI in Industry Equilibrium”,
Journal of the European Economic Association, Vol. 1, No.2.
[27] Grossman, G. and Helpman, E. (2005), ”Outsourcing in a Global Economy”, Review of
Economic Studies, Vol. 72, No.1.
[28] Haddad, M. and Harrison, A. (1993), ”Are there Positive Spillovers from Direct Foreing In-
vestment? Evidence from Panel Data from Morocco”, Journal of Development Economics,
Vol. 42.
[29] Hopenhayn, H. (1992), ”Entry, Exit, and firm Dynamics in the Long-Run”, Econometrica,
Vol. 60, Issue 5.
[30] Javorcik Smarzynska B.(2004), ”Does Foreign Direct Investment Increase the Productiv-
ity of Domestic Firms? In Search of Spillovers through Backward Linkages”, American
Economic Review, Vol. 94.
[31] Javorcik Smarzynska B. and Spatareanu M. (2008), ”To Share or Not To Share: Does Local
Participation Matter for Spillovers from FDI?”, Journal of Development Economics, Vol.
85.
[32] Javorcik, B., Keller, W., Tybout, J. (2006), ”Openness and industrial response in a Wal-
Mart world : a case study of Mexican soaps, detergents, and surfactant producers”, World
Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3999.
[33] Kokko, A. (1996), “Productivity spillovers from competition between local firms and for-
eign affiliates”, Journal of International Development, Vol. 8, 517-530.
[34] Kokko, A., M. Zejan and R. Tansini, (1994), ”Trade Regime and Spillover Effects of FDI:
Evidence from Uruguay”, Review of World Economics Vol. 137, 124-49.
[35] Konings, J. (2001), ”The Effects of Foreign Direct Investment on Domestic Firms: Evi-
dence from Firm-level Panel Data in Emerging Eonomies”, CEPR Discussion Paper 2586.
[36] Kugler, M (2005), ”Spillovers from Foreign Direct Investment: Within or Between Indus-
tries?”, Journal of Development Economics, Vol. 80, Issue 2.
27
[37] Lipsey, R. (2002) ”Home and Host Country Effects of FDI”, NBER Working Papers 9293.
[38] Lin, P. and Saggi, K. (2007) ”Multinational, Exclusity, and Backward Linkages”, Journal
of International Economics, Vol. 71, pp. 206-220.
[39] Markusen, J. , and Venables, A.(1999), “Foreign direct investment as a catalyst for indus-
trial development.” European Economic Review, Vol. 43.
[40] Melitz, Marc J. (2003) ”The Impact of Trade on Intra-Industry Reallocations on Aggregate
Industry Productivity”, Econometrica, Vol. 71, Issue 6.
[41] Morrison, J. (2006) ”The Emerging Role of Private Social and Environmental Interna-
tional Standards in Economic Globalization”, International Environmental Law Commit-
tee Newsletter, VOl. 1, Issue 3, Winter/Spring.
[42] 0’Malley (1995), ”An Analysis of Secondary Employment Associated with Manufacturing
Industry”, General Research Series Paper No. 167, Dublin: The Economic and Social
Research Institute.
[43] OECD (2002), ”Encouraging Linkages Between Small and Medium-sized Companies and
Multinational Entreprises”, OECD, Paris.
[44] Rodriguez-Clare, A. (1996) ”Multinationals, Linkages, and Economic Development”,
American Economic Review, Vol. 86.
[45] Rodriguez-Clare, A. (2005) ”Coordination Failures, Clusters and Microeconomic Interven-
tions”, Economia, Vol. 6, Issue 1.
[46] Schoors, K. and B. Van der Tol (2002), ”Foreign Direct Investment Spillovers Within
and Between Sectors: Evidence from Hungarian Data”, Ghent University, Working Paper
2002/157.
[47] Shoemaker, D.; Ulferts, G. and Jovanovic, V. (1995) ”In search of excellence, or adequacy?
The plight of multinational business looking for a quality concept”,Multinational Business
Review, Fall.
[48] Sjoholm, (1999), ”Technology Gap, Competition and Spillovers from Direct Foreign In-
vestment: evidence from establishment data”, Journal of Development Studies, Vol. 36,
No. 1.
[49] Sutton (2004) ”The Auto-component Supply Chain in China and India A Benchmarking
Study”, mimeo, London School of Economics.
[50] Thoenig, M. and Verdier, T. (2003), ”A Theory of Defensive Skill Biased Innovation and
Globalization”, American Economic Review, Vol. 93, Issue 3.
[51] UNCTAD (2001), World Investment Report 2001: Promoting Linkages. United Nations,
New York and Geneva.
[52] UNCTAD (2007), ”Food Safety and Environmental Requirements in Export Markets -
Friend or Foe for Producers of Fruit and Vegetables in Asian Developing Countries?”,
United Nations, New York and Geneva.
[53] Verhoogen, E. (2008) ”Trade, Quality Upgrading and Wage Inequality in the Mexican
Manufacturing Sector”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 72, Issue 2.
28
Appendix A: Endogenous technological choice of multina-
tional firms
Formally, if the adoption of the local technology is costless, multinational firms prefer the local
technology as long as the cost of using the local technology CD is lower than the cost of using
the M-technology, CM . From equation (4), where the relative cost is endogenously determined
by the relative efficiency of the foreign technology and the relative number of firms in the
downstream industry, we can derive the following proposition:
Proposition 5 An equilibrium with technological segmentation is feasible only when the fol-
lowing condition (S) is verified:
Λ1−ηM
Λ1−ηD
>
(
ND
NM
)1− 1θ
.
Furthermore, condition (W) (see proposition 2) implies (S) but the opposite does not hold:
technological segmentation might arise even if it is welfare reducing and the adoption of the
local technology is costless.
Appendix B: Productivity dispersion among suppliers and
profits by multinational firms
We want to compare the relative ”real” cost CMCD of multinational firms with suppliers hetero-
geneity with the case of homogenous capabilities (as previously, relative costs determine the
profits of downstream firms). In the case of homogenous suppliers, relative productivity is given
by expression (4). Since no tractable solution is available for n and c∗ at equilibrium in the
case of heterogenous suppliers, it is not possible to express the relative productivity of MNEs
as a function of exogenous parameters. However, since endogenous equilibrium outcomes are
observable, it is still interesting to formulate conditions that could be empirically tested. For-
mally, we obtain that supplier heterogeneity yields large profits for multinational firms if and
only if the following condition is verified:∫ c∗
0
(c1−σ − c∗1−σ)dH(c) < fe
fe + fq
∫ ∞
c∗
(c ∗1−σ −c1−σ)dH(c)
where H(c) is the cumulative distribution of supplier costs and c∗ is the equilibrium cost
threshold below which suppliers switch to the M-technology.
Because this condition may not always be verified, there is no clear cut answer on the effect
of heterogeneity in suppliers capability. However we can draw two main conclusions:
1. Productivity dispersion benefits MNEs when the total demand for M-type inputs is low,
which means that they source from only few of them (c∗ is low). This effect may be
simply explained by increasing returns to scale: heterogeneity permits to increase the
relative production of the best suppliers for a given proportion of firms paying the fixed
upgrading costs.
2. For a given threshold c∗, productivity dispersion among best suppliers, which increases
competition among firms producing M-type inputs, tend to reduce MNEs profits. In-
versely, productivity dispersion among low productivity suppliers increases MNEs profits.
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Appendix C: Proofs of Propositions and results
Section 4
• The complete system in n and q.
We first provide the complete system of equations:{
piM (q, n) = fe + fq
piD(q, n) = fe
Demand for M-type inputs is proportional to the market share of multinational firms SM
whereas demand for D-type inputs is proportional to (1− SM ). It follows that:
piM = αEnq SM
piD = αEn(1−q) (1− SM )
Total market share of multinational firms is given by:
SM =
NM (CM )1−η
NM (CM )1−η +ND(CD)1−η
Given the price index of each type of inputs, we obtain variable costs in the downstream
industry:
CM = cλM (nq)
1
1−σ
CD = cλD(n(1− q)) 11−σ
From these three sets of equations, we obtain the final system of two equations in two unknowns
n and q: 
piM = αEnq .
NMλ
1−η
M
q
1−η
1−σ
NMλ
1−η
M
q
1−η
1−σ +NDλ
1−η
D
(1−q)
1−η
1−σ
= fe + fq
piD = αEn(1−q) .
NDλ
1−η
D
(1−q)
1−η
1−σ
NMλ
1−η
M
q
1−η
1−σ +NDλ
1−η
D
(1−q)
1−η
1−σ
= fe
• Solving the system
First, by multiplying both equations by q and (1 − q) respectively and summing them, we
obtain n as a function of q:
n =
αE
fe + qfq
Second, by taking the ratio of both equations, we obtain that the ratio of market shares of
downstream firms must equal the ratio of total fixed costs paid by their respective suppliers:
NMλ
1−η
M q
1−η
1−σ
NDλ
1−η
D (1− q)
1−η
1−σ
=
(fe + fq)q
fe(1− q)
solving for q1−q , we obtain equation (??) in the text.
• Proof of Proposition 2
First note that, given that mark-ups are constant, the price index in the downstream industry,
P , is a simple function of downstream costs:
P 1−η = ρ1−η
[
NMC
1−η
M +NDC
1−η
D
]
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where ρ = ηη−1 is the mark-up over marginal costs charged by downstream producers. Replacing
by the expressions for CM and CD in terms of the endogenous variables n and q, we have:
P = ρ1−ηc1−ηn
1−η
1−σ
[
NMλ
1−η
M q
1−η
1−σ +NDλ
1−η
D (1− q)
1−η
1−σ
]
Replacing n and q for their equilibrium values, introducing ΛT as in the text (with T ∈ {M,D})
and rearranging, we obtain the price index in the technological segmentation equilibrium:
P 1−η = ρ1−ηc1−η(αE)
1−η
1−σ
[
NθM (Λ
1−η
M )
θ +NθD(Λ
1−η
D )
θ
] 1
θ
In a non-segmented equilibrium with the same number of downstream firms, the price index
would be:
P 1−η = ρ1−ηc1−η(αE)
1−η
1−σ [NM +ND] Λ
1−η
D
The proposition compares these two expressions.
Section 5
• The complete system in n and q with flexibility
Incorporating the compatibility parameters, costs for each technology are given by:
CM = cλMn
1
1−σ [q +m1−σ(1− q)] 11−σ
CD = cλDn
1
1−σ [1− q + d1−σq] 11−σ
Let us then define an equivalent number of suppliers with more flexible use of inputs across
technologies:
q˜M = q +m1−σ(1− q)
q˜D = 1− q + d1−σq
The system of equations characterizing the equilibrium is now:
piM = αEnq˜M .S˜M +
αEd1−σ
nq˜D
.(1− S˜M ) = fe + fq
piD = αEnq˜D .(1− S˜M ) + αEm
1−σ
nq˜M
.S˜M = fe
with: S˜M =
NMλ
1−η
M
q˜
1−η
1−σ
M
NMλ
1−η
M
q˜
1−η
1−σ
M
+NDλ
1−η
D
q˜
1−η
1−σ
D
Solving for the system above, we obtain that the expression for n (as a function of q) remains
the same as in expression (??) in the main text, but now equilibrium q verifies:
q +m1−σ(1− q)
1− q + d1−σq =
(
NM
ND
λ1−ηM
λ1−ηD
[
fe −m1−σ(fe + fq)
(fe + fq)− d1−σfe
])θ
relative costs are found by introducing this expression into the previous one for CD and CM .
• Proof of Proposition 4
The relative productivity of multinational firms increases with:
fe −m1−σ(fe + fq)
(fe + fq)− d1−σfe
This term is decreasing with m1−σ and thus increasing with m.
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when m = d = τ , the relative productivity of MNEs increases with:
fe − τ1−σ(fe + fq)
(fe + fq)− τ1−σfe
it is decreasing with τ1−σ and thus increasing with τ .
• Heterogeneous suppliers
Existence and uniqueness of the solution is guaranteed as long as:∫ c∗
0
c1−σdH(c)
c ∗1−σ H(c∗)
is bounded when c∗ decreases towards zero (a formal proof may be available upon request).
With heterogeneous suppliers with costs drawn from a cumulative distribution H(c), similar
calculus as previously show that:
CM
CD
=
λM
λD
1+ η−1σ−η
(
ND
NM
fe + fq
fe
) 1
σ−η
1− fqfe+fq ∫∞c∗ (c ∗1−σ −c1−σ)dG(c)
1− fqfe
∫ c∗
0
(c1−σ − c∗1−σ)dG(c)
 1σ−η
If we compare to the equilibrium relative cost with homogenous suppliers, we obtain condition
(H).
Section 6: Long run
• How to derive fM (q)
In autarky, the free entry condition for domestic firms yields:
FD =
βE
P 1−ηa
C1−ηDa ϕ˜
η−1
D
where C1−ηDa denotes the variable cost of using the D-technology under autarky, β is a constant
(depending only on η and σ), and ϕ˜η−1D =
∫∞
0
ϕη−1dG(ϕ) denotes the average capability of
domestic firms.
With FDI, free entry for multinational firms (FEM, equation 5.5) writes: FM = βEP 1−ηC
1−η
M ϕ˜
η−1
M .
Then, compared to autarky, we obtain:
P 1−η
P 1−ηa
=
FD
FM
C1−ηM
C1−ηDa
ϕ˜η−1M
ϕ˜η−1D
Finally, given equation (2) and (3) of Section 4 (equilibrium in the upstream sector) and using
1−η
1−σ = 1−1θ , we have C1−ηDa = λ1−ηD
(
1
fe
)1− 1θ
and C1−ηM = λ
1−η
M
(
q
fe+qfq
)1− 1θ . If we suppose that
the distribution of capabilities is Pareto: G(ϕ) = 1−
(
ϕ
ϕ
)−γ
, with γ > η−1, we finally obtain:
P 1−η
P 1−ηa
= fM (q) ≡ ΩM
( q
1 + q · ( fqfe )
)1− 1θ
where ΩM ≡ FDFM
γ+1−η
γ
ϕ˜η−1
M
ϕη−1 .
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• How to derive fD(q)
The threshold ϕ∗ above which domestic firms choose the foreign technology is determined by
equation (FTD, equation 5.4) which can be written:
Fq =
βE
P 1−η
C1−ηM (ϕ
∗)η−1 − βE
P 1−η
C1−ηD (ϕ
∗)η−1
The free entry equation for domestic firms (FED, equation 5.3) gives:
FD =
∫ ϕ∗
0
(
βE
P 1−η
C1−ηD ϕ
η−1
)
dG(ϕ) +
∫ ∞
ϕ∗
(
βE
P 1−η
C1−ηM ϕ
η−1 − Fq
)
dG(ϕ)
Comparing with autarky, and incorporating the equation for ϕ∗, this can be rewritten:
P 1−η
P 1−ηa
=
C1−ηD
C1−ηDa
[
1 +
(
C1−ηM
C1−ηD
− 1
)(∫∞
ϕ∗ (ϕ
1−η − (ϕ∗)η−1)dG(ϕ)∫∞
ϕ∗ ϕ
1−ηdG(ϕ)
)]
When G is a Pareto distribution, the last term can be written as a simple function of ϕ∗:(∫∞
ϕ∗ (ϕ
1−η − (ϕ∗)η−1)dG(ϕ)∫∞
ϕ∗ ϕ
1−ηdG(ϕ)
)
=
η − 1
γ
(
ϕ∗
ϕ
)η−1−γ
By using both the equation for technological choice and the free entry equation for multinational
firms, we obtain that (ϕ∗)η−1 = ϕ˜η−1M
Fq
FM
(
1− C
1−η
M
C1−η
D
)−1
.
Finally, by incorporating the value for ϕ∗, C1−ηM and C
1−η
Da derived above, and using
C1−η
M
C1−η
D
=
λ1−η
M
λ1−η
D
(
q
1−q
)1− 1θ
, we obtain that P
1−η
P 1−ηa
= fD(q) where:
fD(q) ≡
[
1 + ΩD
[
λ1−η
M
λ1−η
D
( q1−q )
1− 1θ − 1
] γ
η−1
(λ
1−η
M
λ1−η
D
)−(
γ
η−1−1)( q1−q )
−(1− 1θ )( γη−1−1)
](
1−q
1+q·( fqfe )
)1− 1θ
and where ΩD ≡ η−1γ
ϕ˜η−1−γ
M
ϕη−1−γ (
FM
Fq
)
γ+1−η
η−1 .
• Entry barrier for domestic firms
A necessary and sufficient condition for the entry of domestic firms when the downstream
industry is populated only by multinational firms (with equilibrium in the upstream industry)
is: limq→1 fD(q) > limq→1 fM (q), which is equivalent to ΩD > ΩM .
• Figures
Figure 1 in the text was built with by plugging in the following values in the above expression:
θ = 5, ΩM = 0.9, ΩD = 1.3,
λ1−η
M
λ1−η
D
= 1.5, fq = 0 and γη−1 = 3.
And Figure 2 changes to ΩD = 0.7.
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Figure 1: Long run equilibria with low technology adoption costs
Figure 2: Long run equilibria with high technology adoption costs
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